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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




On May 18, 1999, appellant Julie Welker ran against 
appellee Darrell Clarke in the Democratic primary for the 
Fifth Council District seat on the Philadelphia City Council. 
According to the official election results, Welker received 
140 fewer votes than Clarke. Immediately following the 
election, Welker began an investigation of the area where 
Clarke had received the majority of his votes. 1 Welker 
maintains this investigation revealed a patter n of fraud and 
illegality, including votes cast by persons who did not meet 
Pennsylvania's residency requirements. More specifically, 
Welker alleged that, contrary to state law, officials of the 
County Board of Elections permitted persons who had 
moved to vote in the election districts wher e they had 
formerly resided. During discovery W elker produced lists of 
approximately 300 persons who cast votes, but whose listed 
addresses were for abandoned homes and empty lots.2 She 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Welker and several supporters initiallyfiled an election contest in the 
Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County claiming that numerous 
signatures in the poll books (indicating who had voted) were forged. The 
state court provided an accelerated schedule of discovery and Welker 
eventually identified over one thousand supposedly suspect signatures. 
On the date both sides were to provide the reports of their handwriting 
experts Welker moved to withdraw her petition without prejudice, a 
motion that was subsequently granted. In this federal action Welker has 
not pointed to a single allegedly forged signature. 
2. The Board of Elections presented evidence to the District Court that at 
least 54 of the challenged voters did, in fact, r eside in their voting 
districts. For example, some of the voters' addr esses were misprinted in 
the registration records and others had resided at their registered 
addresses at the time of the primary, but had since moved. The Board 
also presented evidence that three of the challenged voters had not voted 
in the election. There were no findings of fact made by the District Court 
regarding these competing claims and we ar e thus unable to determine 
how many votes might have been cast by voters who did not then live in 
the voting districts in which they were r egistered. 
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also identified persons who voted, but who had moved from 
the residence listed in the voter registration rolls many 
years prior. In two instances, those persons no longer 
resided in the city or county in which they voted. She 
argues that the intentional or reckless failure of the County 
Board and Division officials to comply with state residency 
requirements destroyed the integrity of the voter 
registration rolls and amounted to stuffing the ballot box in 
violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1983, the 
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1971, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The validity of these causes of action is based 
on the specific allegation in Welker's complaint that election 
officials conspired with the Clark campaign to violate 
election laws in order to dilute the votes of W elker's 
supporters. In the absence of such an allegation, it is not 
clear that claims made by Welker would support 
intervention by a federal court in this election. 3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This was a purely municipal election, with no federal candidates on 
the ballot. There are no contentions that election officials treated the 
supporters of the two candidates differ ently. Further, Welker has not 
argued that the supposed violations of the election laws could not have 
been remedied in a state court action. If W elker's claims were only that 
officials negligently maladministered the election by not properly 
enforcing the Pennsylvania residency r equirements as interpreted by 
Welker, we would hesitate to intervene. Under similar circumstances, 
other circuits have determined that such disputes do not state a 
constitutional violation and therefore do not rise to the level 
appropriate 
to support federal court interference in a local election. See Gold v. 
Feinberg, 101 F.3d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1996) (refusing to interfere in a 
state election where one-third of voting machines arrived late, some 
ballots were defective, and an ineligible candidate was on the ballot); 
Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 1986) (Court found no 
equal protection violation in the absence of evidence that 
maladministration of local election was the r esult of an intent to 
discriminate against voters or to subvert their right to choose their 
representative); Hennings v. Grafton , 523 F.2d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 1975) 
(finding no constitutional violation where irregularities were caused by 
mechanical or human error and were not due to invidious or fraudulent 
intent); Pettengill v. Putnam County R-1 School District, 472 F.2d 121, 
122 (8th Cir. 1973) (no constitutional basis for intervening in a local 
election absent aggravating factors such as evidence of race 
discrimination, fraudulent interference with election results, or other 
unlawful conduct interfering with an individual's right to vote). 
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During the course of the proceedings in the court below, 
Welker moved for a preliminary injunction and declaratory 
judgment that voters could not vote in state and municipal 
elections if they were registered as residing at addresses 
from which they had moved pursuant to 25 P .S. 
S 961.901(B)(2). The district court denied these motions 
concluding that Pennsylvania law did not preclude such 
persons from voting. As a result of this ruling Welker 
concluded that she could not meet her burden of showing 
sufficient illegal votes to overturn the election. Therefore, 
she moved for an adverse order dismissing the case in 
order to appeal this determinative ruling. Appellees, Clarke 
and the Philadelphia County Board of Elections, cross- 
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted 
the motion for summary judgment and Welker now appeals 
that order. Because we agree with the district court that 
Pennsylvania law does not preclude persons who are 
registered at addresses from which they have moved from 
voting, we will affirm the district court's grant of summary 




Welker's underlying claim alleges that the failure of 
election officials to enforce Pennsylvania's voter eligibility 
requirements amounted to ballot-stuffing and voter dilution 
in violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.S 1983, the 
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1971, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment. We exercise subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 28 U.S.C.S 1343. 
 
Welker's attempt to prove that illegal votes were cast in 
the May 18, 1999, Philadelphia City Council election turns 
on the interpretation of S 901(B)(2) andS 501(A) of the 
Pennsylvania Voter Registration Act (PVRA). Section 
901(B)(2) provides: 
 
       An elector who removes residence fr om one place to 
       another within the same county and who has not yet 
       filed a removal notice with the commission shall be 
       permitted to vote at the election next following removal 
       if, at the time of signing [the] voters certificate, the 
       elector files with the judge of elections a signed removal 
       notice properly filled out. 
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Section 501(A) provides in relevant part,"[i]f an individual 
is qualified to vote in an election district prior to removal of 
residence, the individual may, if a resident of this 
Commonwealth, vote in the election district fr om which 
residence was removed within the 30 days preceding the 
election." Welker urges that the pr oper construction of 
these two sections of the PVRA is that, if a person has 
moved more than 30 days prior to a state or municipal 
election, that person may not legally vote in the election 
district where s/he formerly resided unless (a) the new 
residence is in the same county; (b) the election in which 
the voter seeks to vote is the first election since the move; 
and (c) the voter files a "removal notice" with the judge of 
election upon showing up to vote. The purported rationale 
of this provision is to serve the compelling state interest of 
preventing fraud and dilution of the votes of persons 
actually residing in the election district. Under this 
interpretation, each of the 300 voters identified by Welker 
were ineligible to vote. 
 
At first glance this interpretation has some appeal. 
However, a closer inspection reveals that Welker's urged 
construction conflicts with other, contr olling provisions of 
the PVRA and runs contrary to the Pennsylvania 
legislature's intent to create a single, unified electorate for 
both state and federal elections. Pennsylvania adopted the 
PVRA in 1995, in response to the passage of the National 
Voter Registration Act (NVRA) in 1993. One of the NVRA's 
central purposes was to dramatically expand opportunities 
for voter registration and to ensure that, once registered, 
voters could not be removed from the r egistration rolls by 
a failure to vote or because they had changed addresses. 42 
U.S.C.A. S 1973gg(b). To achieve this purpose, the NVRA 
strictly limited removal of voters based on change of 
address and instead required that, for federal elections, 
states maintain accurate registration r olls by using reliable 
information from government agencies such as the Postal 
Service's change of address records. 42 U.S.C.A. S 1973gg- 
6(b)(1). The NVRA went even further by also r equiring the 
implementation of "fail-safe" voting pr ocedures to ensure 
voters would not be removed from r egistration rolls due to 
clerical errors or the voter's own failur e to re-register at a 
new address. 42 U.S.C.A. S 1973gg-6(b)(1); See also H.R. 
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Rep. No. 103-9, at 18 (1993), reprinted in 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 105. Of course, these procedur es were 
mandated only with respect to federal elections. 42 U.S.C.A. 
S 1973gg(b). States remained free to maintain a different 
voter registration system for state and local elections, even 
though doing so would create two differ ent electorates. 
 
Because it quickly became apparent that maintaining two 
sets of registration rolls would impose massive 
administrative and economic burdens, most states elected 
to adopt the NVRA registration procedur es for their state 
and local elections as well as federal elections, thereby 
producing a single, unified registration system and 
electorate. Pennsylvania is no exception. In early 1995, 
Pennsylvania was sued in federal court for its failure to 
comply with the NVRA. See Association of Community 
Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Ridge, et al., Civ. 
A. No. 95-382 (E.D. Pa.). The court entered an Order 
holding that several aspects of Pennsylvania election law 
conflicted with and were therefor e pre-empted by the NVRA 
with respect to federal elections. ACORN v. Ridge, 1995 WL 
136913 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1995). The ACORN court 
specifically referenced the parts of Pennsylvania law that 
required the filing of removal notices for continued 
eligibility to vote as contravening the fail-safe pr ovisions of 
the NVRA. ACORN v. Ridge, Order (E.D. Pa. May 4, 1995). 
 
In response to the enactment of the NVRA and the 
ACORN decision, Pennsylvania enacted significant changes 
to its voting laws. When enacting the new election law, the 
PVRA, the legislature had two goals in mind - to adopt a 
single, unified registration system, fully compliant with the 
NVRA for both federal and local elections, while also 
maintaining as much of Pennsylvania's pre-NVRA 
registration system as possible. The pr ovisions upon which 
Welker relies are provisions that were carried over from 
Pennsylvania's pre-NVRA registration system. 25 P.S. 
SS 961.501, 961.901. Compare 25 P.S. SS 623-21 (repealed), 
623-28 (repealed), 951-19 (repealed), 951-26 (repealed). 
Recognizing that many of the carry-over provisions were 
potentially inconsistent with the NVRA, the legislature also 
adopted a parallel set of procedures intended to comply the 
NVRA. Those procedures, set out in Chapter 19 of the 
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PVRA, were adopted to permit Chapter 19 to supersede the 
carry-over provisions if the Secretary of the Commonwealth 
determined that the carry-over provisions were inconsistent 
with the mandates of the NVRA. 25 P.S. S 961.5103. Within 
weeks of the passage of the PVRA, the Secretary suspended 
SS 906-912 in deference to Chapter 19. Pennsylvania 
Bulletin Vol. 25, No. 28 (July 15, 1995). 
 
Chapter 19 of the PVRA establishes procedur es virtually 
identical to those of the NVRA for the removal of voters 
from Pennsylvania registration rolls for state and local 
elections. Section 1901 strictly limits the manner and 
circumstances under which a voter's registration may be 
canceled. 25 P.S. S 961.1901. Section 1901(a) provides: 
 
       An elector's registration shall not be canceled except as 
       follows: 
 
       (1) At the request of the elector. 
 
       (2) Upon the death of the elector under section 905. 
 
       (3) Upon confirmation that the elector has moved to a 
       residence outside the county. 
 
       (4) Under a voter removal program as pr ovided for 
       under subsection (b). 
 
Subsection (b) specifies the required and permissible voter 
removal programs, which requir e the updating of 
registration records based on either information supplied 
by the Postal Service or obtained by a commission through 
countywide confirmation mailings and per mitting the use of 
district-wide canvasses and confirmation notices mailed to 
voters who have not voted within five years. 25 P .S. 
S 961.1901(b). Further, S 1901(d) narrowly restricts the 
ability of a commission to cancel the registration of a voter 
if there is any possibility the voter has changed residence. 
Under the terms of Chapter 19, none of the 300 voters 
challenged by Welker voted illegally. 
 
There is a clear conflict between appellants' 
interpretation of SS 961.501 and 961.901 and Chapter 19. 
The Pennsylvania legislature and the Secr etary of the 
Commonwealth have made it exceedingly clear that when 
such conflicts arise, the provisions of Chapter 19 must 
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control. To hold otherwise would be to cr eate a system 
whereby some voters are eligible to vote only in state and 
local elections, but other voters are eligible to vote in all 
elections. This is exactly the kind of dual r egistration 
system the Pennsylvania legislature sought to avoid by 
enacting the PVRA. 
 
Appellants argue that such an interpretation is contrary 
to established rules of statutory construction that hold that 
"when construing a statute, it is the function of the court 
to give effect to all of its provisions." In re Canvassing of 
Certain Voting Machines, 475 A.2d at 1325, 1327 (1984). 
This argument ignores the clear dir ection of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that: 
 
       The language of a statute must be read in a sense 
       which harmonizes with the subject matter and its 
       general purpose and object. The general design and 
       purpose of the law is to be kept in view and the statute 
       given a fair and reasonable construction with a view to 
       effecting its purpose and object, even if it be necessary, 
       in doing so, to restrict somewhat the for ce of 
       subsidiary provisions that otherwise would conflict 
       with the paramount intent. 
 
Swartley v. Harris, 40 A.2d 409, 411 (Pa. 1944). The 
overriding purpose of the Legislature in enacting the PVRA 
was to comply with the NVRA in such a way as to cr eate a 
single unified system of voter registration in the state. If 
S 901(B)(2) were interpreted in the manner proposed by 
Welker, that paramount intent would clearly be defeated. 
Thus, the District Court properly deter mined that Welker's 
interpretation of the statute could not be given effect. In 
affirming the District Court, we are not holding that 
S 901(B)(2) is completely null and void. Rather, we are 
merely holding that this provision cannot have the meaning 
urged by Welker. We will leave it to the state courts of 
Pennsylvania, deciding future election contr oversies, to 
determine what, if any, permissible meaning might be given 
to S 901(B)(2).4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. For example, in the present case the District Court noted that 
S 901(B)(2) can be interpreted as simply outlining one of several ways to 
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Finally, appellants argue that there is no conflict because 
they are not suggesting that the contested voters should be 
removed from the registration r olls. Instead, they argue 
these voters are simply ineligible to vote. W e decline to 
adopt this semantic distinction. If voters ar e declared 
"ineligible" even though they are r egistered to vote, the 
effect is the same -- they are excluded from voting in state 
and local elections, while remaining "eligible" to vote in 
federal elections thereby contravening the expr ess purpose 
of the PVRA to create a unified electorate. If state election 
officials were required to implement S 901(B)(2) in the 
manner suggested by Welker, it would be necessary for the 
voter registration lists to indicate whether voters were 
eligible to vote in all elections or only in federal elections. 
This would impose the precise burden that the 
Pennsylvania Legislature sought to avoid when it enacted 
the PVRA. 
 
Appellants' interpretation of SS 501(A) and 901(B)(2) 
creates a direct conflict with Chapter 19 of the PVRA. The 
legislature was clear that when carry-over pr ovisions like 
901(B)(2) and 501(A) conflict with Chapter 19, Chapter 19 
is controlling. In light of our construction of the statute, 
Welker herself acknowledges that she cannot meet the 
burden of proving the existence of "illegal" votes, a 




For the foregoing reason, the District Court's judgment of 
January 31, 2000 will be affirmed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
register to vote, thus completely avoiding a conflict between it and 
Chapter 19. Welker v. Clarke, Memorandum (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 1999). 
There may be other possible interpretations that could be applied 
consistent with the overall purpose of the PVRA. The meaning of 
S 901(B)(2) is not relevant to the dispute before us, however, and it is 
not 
our intent to fix that meaning in this opinion. 
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